Medical network on December 15 - in recent years, along with medicine price marketization reform deepening, many originally stable supply and demand of cheap drugs have on the price of "flying" wonders. Released on November 24, 2016, the state administration for industry and commerce of chongqing industrial and commercial bureau of abuse of dominant market position in southwest pharmaceutical two plant penalty. Involved in fines and confiscation of illegal income is only 500000 yuan, this allows the outside to look cheap medicine in recent years, for much of the "flying".
Southwest pharmaceutical factory since June 2012, become the only domestic upstream phenol API manufacturers, and since the food and drug administration approved the drug import qualification, no make the plant has a 100% market share in domestic phenol API. Since 2014, the factory and Shanghai pioneer pharmaceutical group Shanghai new pharmaceutical joint-stock restructuring henan shangqiu new pioneer pharmaceutical co., LTD., signed an agreement, is subject to the latter assist sales gastrodine, authorization in shangqiu new pioneer as phenol API sole agent. May be the same period by chongqing survey qingyang pharmaceutical similar illegal behavior, the influence of southwest pharmaceutical factory to cancel the 2 August 2014 with the sole agency phenol API. But, in fact, the plant production phenol apis are mainly sold to itself is not engaged in production of phenol medicine preparations shangqiu new pioneer, and refused to downstream in the production of phenol medicine preparations and old customers with phenol API for 23 a monthly.
Phenol API over the same period, the market sales price from an average of 127.47 yuan/kg, rose to the highest 5320 yuan/kg, by 40 times; New pioneer company sell corn plaster production enterprise phenol API price for 1000 yuan/kg, sold to other phenol API demand the lowest price 660 yuan/kg of the enterprise, the highest 3400 yuan/kg; Southwest pharmaceutical factory 2 to pioneer new quotation from the original 260 yuan/kg rose to 657 yuan/kg, is five times as many as 2014 years ago to old customer offer.
Southwest pharmaceutical factory two aforesaid actions lead to rely on phenol apis to manufacturer of corns ointment production, production, or production, relative capacity loss more than 1.32 million yuan. The sale price of corn plaster from about 1, 2012 yuan/box, rose to a peak of 2015 9 yuan/box, was forced to change the packing after corn plaster has risen to about 20 yuan/box, up nearly 20 times.
Compared to chongqing qingyang pharmaceutical industry due to the implementation of the same illegal act, was fined relevant sales last year's 3%, but have not confiscate the illegal income, southwest pharmaceutical factory is given a lighter punishment 2 relevant sales last year's 1%, but was confiscated illegal income of about 500000 yuan, can be seen as a step forward. But according to the penalty decision, only in 2015, for example, southwest pharmaceutical factory sold 2700 kg 2 phenol apis, revenue of nearly 1.723 million yuan, an average of 638 yuan/kg, than in January 2014 to 11 companies sold 1.13 tons of phenol API when the average price of 128.82 yuan/kg, high nearly 510 yuan/kg, more income of about 1.375 million yuan, significantly higher than the law enforcers to implement illegal ACTS of illegal incomes confiscated by 23 months.
, of course, for the vast number of consumers, maybe is more concerned by a sole agency agreement to buy phenol API prescription group's youthful - shangqiu new pioneer also alleged violation of the anti-monopoly law, and whether it will induce hospital, preparation plant using the phenol API prices together.
But according to the penalty decision: in 2015, southwest pharmaceutical factory sold 2700 kg 2 phenol apis, revenue of nearly 1.723 million yuan, an average of 638.51 yuan/kg, more than 2014 years ago, phenol API price 127.47 yuan/kg, high nearly 510 yuan/kg; Sales of 7690 kg in 2014, sales of 2.21396 million yuan, sales an average of 287.90 yuan/kg, up nearly 160 yuan/kg. Compared to the price level of 2014 years ago, southwest pharmaceutical factory more than two years combined revenue was 2.6 million yuan, even excluding production costs about 961800 over the same period growth, income of about 1.6382 million yuan, more than the actual be confiscated of the illegal income, high of 1.1554 million yuan.
, of course, for the vast number of consumers, maybe is more concerned by a sole agency agreement to buy phenol API prescription group's youthful - shangqiu new pioneer also alleged violation of the anti-monopoly law, and whether it will induce the use of phenol API hospital, medicament and synergy, exponentially magnify the dangers of limiting competition behavior.
To this, chongqing qingyang pharmaceutical case or can provide some clues.
Following the end of 2015, is responsible for investigating non-price class limit competition behavior of the system of industry and commerce of chongqing qingyang pharmaceutical don't Piao alcohol abuse of dominant position limits to the downstream manufacturers supply behavior to make punishment, after the end of January 2016, is responsible for investigating the price class limit competition behavior of the national development and reform commission by the anti-monopoly enforcement authority, qingyang sales and its associated enterprises in chongqing chongqing datong, with jiangsu wto-day order, medicine group Shanghai sym joint, through mutual exclusive distributor of henan shangqiu huajie, common don't Piao alcohol of price manipulation to the punishment. Unfortunately, the national development and reform commission only for the companies involved in last year's product sales of 5%, 8% respectively fining, but failed to confiscate the illegal income.
However, chongqing qingyang pharmaceutical case law enforcement relay to see the outside world a cheap medicine price the secrets of the "flying" :
First of all, a drug company to become the only API manufacturers, domestic monopoly; Then, downstream monopolist to individual only dosage drug supply, severely limits the downstream competition, at the same time raise the supply price; In the end, the medicament by direct price collusion, or through mutual exclusive distributor, or through their respective dealers of collusion between, or restrict dealer minimum resale price, realization of medicine price manipulation, and even manipulate the provincial drug centralized purchasing bidding activities.
Price increases speed, and no doubt be manipulated drug when the market circulation of stock will be burned off. But, if can have large pharmaceutical circulation enterprises to participate in price manipulation, and manipulated medicines market scale is not big, the original price is very low, so can in the short term price "the flying apsaras".
Don't Piao alcohol piece price manipulation case, for example, don't Piao alcohol prices from 10 yuan/bottle, in 2014 after the illegal manipulation reaches more than 23.8 yuan/bottle. As an organizer of price manipulation, chongqing qingyang pharmaceutical involved income up to 22.565 million yuan in 2014, half of them thanks to price manipulation, in addition to about 1.8 million yuan, never failed to antitrust enforcers confiscated by the national development and reform commission according to the illegal income. Concretely to the southwest pharmaceutical factory, whether to have corn plaster or other suspected of manipulating prices, medicament phenol apis to grab the high monopoly profits, is yet to be further investigation, national development and reform commission (NDRC) calculation and confiscate the illegal income.
Across the country, all kinds of limiting competition behavior of the pharmaceutical industry, especially by collusion buyout underwriting, upstream and downstream rivals conspiring to manipulation of prices is still common.
In May 2016, price bureau of jiangsu province for the hui feng subordinates focus of Shanghai biological technology co., LTD. And youthful lianyungang cheng and other chlorinated phenols series products manufacturer punish price manipulation case. In the same year in July, the national development and reform commission check huazhong pharmaceutical, changzhou SiYao, prescription group affiliates shandong sym pharmaceutical co., LTD., the sedative, hypnotic and anti-anxiety effects of second kind psychotropic drugs medicine estazolam API market, estazolam tablets market price manipulation case to carry on the punishment. And as early as in 2011, the national development and reform commission to cross in shandong shun tong and shandong huaxin, upstream dandong medicine and donggang hongda buyout underwriting promethazine hydrochloride, manipulation of the downstream of compound reserpine case made the punishment. In 2012, and sails through mergers and acquisitions to hefei other urea raw material manufacturers, wanton urea raw material price raise intervened.
But, obviously, because most of these cases did not confiscate the illegal income, and the like medtronic case, all failed to case enterprise group in the previous year revenue as fine calculation base, so that the administrative penalties weak, cannot have the warning effect of effort, but inspired restrict competitors "creativity", with more hidden, or newer, more bold and drug price manipulation. On the other hand, if the antitrust enforcers and effective enforcement, according to the legislation, the provisions of article 46 to 1% to 10% of the sales group co., LTD. All punishment subsidiary, youthful violation of the law, then such as Shanghai pharmaceutical group 2015 revenue of 2015 yuan of businesses, and managers will rein in the subordinate enterprises, strictly compliance management, will no longer like the previous case, tolerate youthful three-dimensional restricts competitive behavior in violation of the anti-monopoly law.
Should not be ignored is that, on the other hand, have been able to actively participate in the anti-monopoly law enforcement province administration of industry and commerce, price is only half of the country, and mostly caseload is few, the inexperienced handling the case. Considering the state-backed, many local pharmaceutical companies and supporting effect on provincial economy growth, the local government still lacks the power survey of local enterprises for the national market price manipulation. Without the support of the local law enforcement agencies, national development and reform commission (NDRC), or the state administration for industry and commerce, total no more than 30 people full-time antitrust enforcement team, for all provinces may suspect a timely investigation of price manipulation, even if only with the common people well-being is most closely related to the pharmaceutical industry, medical equipment industry.
To change the present passive situation of enforcement, to better safeguard the people can change from health and medicine in the more "acquisition", rather than pay for the prices of all kinds of illegal manipulation, the anti-monopoly enforcement mechanism not only needs to be perfect, penalties need to improve, the law enforcement team needs to be expanded, more needs to be established for the anti-monopoly law enforcement supervision mechanism of the work itself, especially should strengthen the local governments to cover one's mistakes, not as, and even hinder the supervision of the anti-monopoly law enforcement behavior, the anti-monopoly law enforcement work included in the assessment of local government officials. , meanwhile, is central to the agency at all levels as medicines, medical equipment production, imports of regulators and the examination and approval department, also should establish the cooperation mechanism with the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies at all levels, there may be ready in time for the API production by individual companies exclusive information notice antitrust enforcers, so that the latter timely investigation: there is a batch number of the manufacturer, through production and production manufacturer in the market, the only API manufacturers or importers presence of abuse of dominant position to interfere with the downstream competition behavior whether the existence of the upstream and downstream enterprises API's buyout underwriting, downstream distributors if colluding with the upstream company price fixing, etc. |
